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PUBLIC HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE:
MAINTAINING STATE SOVEREIGNTY
IN THE FEDERALIST STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
Acid deposition, commonly known as "acid rain," accounts for
"respiratory disease in humans, loss of profits from farming, acceler-
ated building deterioration, and numerous negative impacts" on the
natural environment and wildlife.' With respect to human health, the
particulates that form acid deposition can be "inhaled deep into peo-
ple's lungs," exacerbating asthma and bronchitis.2 It has been esti-
mated that, in 2007, approximately 6,000 people will die prematurely
because of the same pollution that makes up acid rain.3 Surprisingly,
the estimated fatality rate would be less than it is today.4
In the United States, the effects of acid deposition are felt almost
exclusively by Northeast states, 5 although the primary sources of sul-
fur dioxide, the main ingredient of acid deposition, are electric utili-
ties in the Midwest and South. Despite this discrepancy, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York recently
DAVID B. FIRESTONE & FRANK C. REED, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR NON-LAWYERS
81(1993).
2 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Effects of Acid Rain: Human Health,
at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acidrain/effects/health.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2003).
3 Eric Pianin & Dan Morgan, Study Says 8 Utilities' Pollution Causes Premature Deaths,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2002, at A4; Katharine Q. Seelye, Study Sees 6,000 Deaths from Power
Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at A21.
4 Seelye, supra note 3.
5 GwYNETH HOWELLS, ACID RAIN AND ACID WATERS 114 (2d ed. 1995).
6 Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), affd on
other grounds, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that 67% of sulfur dioxides come from utili-
ties that generate electricity); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACID RAIN: EMISSIONS TRENDS
AND EFFECTS IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES, available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rcO0047.pdf (Mar. 2000) (analyzing sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxide emissions from electrical utility power plants in the Midwest and their deposition
throughout the U.S.).
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struck down a New York statute that sought to penalize in-state firms
that sold sulfur-dioxide emissions credits to facilities in "Upwind
States."7 In Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki,8 the court ruled that
New York's penalty scheme violated the dormant Commerce Clause
because a penalty on 100 percent of the proceeds from a sale to an
"upwind" facility effectively banned interstate trade of the credits.9
The court reached this conclusion despite New York's claim that it
had the authority to implement such a regulation in order to promote
environmental protection within the state.'
l
Interestingly, while the court struck down the statutory provision,
it recognized the legitimacy of New York's interest in protecting its
environment." If the court recognized the legitimacy of the state
interest, why did it rule that the program violated the Constitution?
Without much discussion, the court found that the New York program
amounted to "economic protectionism."' 2 However, does a program
that has the goal of averting fatal health effects pertain solely to eco-
nomics? Does a state's duty to protect the health and safety of its
citizenry, under its police power, provide an adequate justification for
interference with interstate commerce? Or did acid deposition's im-
pact on farming, structures, and natural resources also play an implicit
role in the court's decision?
When addressing environmental issues under the dormant Com-
merce Clause, the Supreme Court has correctly invalidated state pro-
grams that-at base-manifested protectionist intent. The Framer's
underlying goal in federalizing interstate commercial regulation was
to prevent such protectionist economic measures by the states.13 They
proposed a Constitution that would place the power to regulate inter-
state commerce in the hands of Congress. 14  The Constitution ex-
pressly grants Congress the power "To regulate Commerce... among
the several States ... ,,.s The Supreme Court, however, has gone
further and interpreted the Commerce Clause as providing an implicit,
or "dormant," limitation on the states' ability to regulate interstate
7 Clean Air Mkts. Group, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 162-63. The district court struck down the
law down under both the Supremacy Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. Because
the focus of this Note is on the dormant Commerce Clause, it will not discuss the court's opin-
ion with respect to the Supremacy Clause.
8 194 F. Supp. 2d 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
9 Id. at 160-62.
10 Id. at 159.
1 Id. at 160.
12 Id. at 161.
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
IS U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce. 16 The Court has used the dormant Commerce Clause to
strike down state regulations seeking to pursue the goal of environ-
mental protection when those regulations interfered with interstate
commerce. For the most part, the Court has gotten it right because
the environmental regulations in those cases sought to protect state
natural resources at the expense of out-of-state commercial actors.
However, the Court should affirmatively recognize that environ-
mental protection can entail more than simply natural resources pro-
tection. The other purpose of environmental regulations is the protec-
tion of public health.' Despite this dual purpose of environmental
regulations, however, the Court's language in recent dormant Com-
merce Clause cases has been interpreted to preclude the validity of
any state environmental regulations on the grounds of protectionism.
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, Part I seeks to distin-
guish the two underlying goals of environmental regulation in a man-
ner that is relevant to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Natural resource protection historically has been grounded in eco-
nomic principles.1 Since the beginning of the conservation move-
ment, its proponents have advocated the efficient use of natural re-
sources in terms of prosperity. Because natural resource protection
rests on economic concerns, however, limited resources can make
competing populations susceptible to in-fighting. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that competition over natural resources
can result in the same type of balkanization about which the Framers
were concerned.19 Because the prevention of balkanization is the
underlying goal of the dormant Commerce Clause, the economic con-
16 See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 315-20 (1851) (recogniz-
ing that the grant of authority to Congress in Article I of the Constitution implicitly precluded
the states from enacting laws on national commercial subjects). Commentators consider Cooley
to be the first instance in which the Supreme Court established an implicit limitation on states
under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTtURE 69-71 (1995) (discussing the growth of the dormant Commerce Clause).
17 See State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, Mission Statement, at
http://www.epa.state.oh.us (last visited Sept. 9, 2004) (noting that the Ohio EPA's mission is
"[t]o protect the environment and public health by ensuring compliance with environmental
laws and demonstrating leadership in environmental stewardship").
18 See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5 (2003)
(discussing the relationship between a growing economy and the earth's carrying capacity);
GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 4 (1910) (advocating conservation of natu-
ral resources in terms of national success); Clayton R. Koppes, Efficiency, Equity, Esthetics:
Shifting Themes in American Conservation, in THE ENDS OF THE EARTH: PERSPECTIVES ON
MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (Donald Worster ed., 1988) (discussing the origins and
evolution of the conservation movement).
19 See, e.g., West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911) ("If one state has [the
power to regulate interstate commerce], all states have it; embargo may be retaliated by em-
bargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines.").
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cerns that trigger natural resource protection are relevant to dormant
Commerce Clause cases.
Although the Framers sought to prevent balkanization, they did
recognize one particular limitation to this goal: a state's sovereign
powers. With respect to this constraint, it is vital to recognize that the
protection of public health is intimately connected to a state's police
power. Those areas of life falling under the police power were within
the purview of state regulation prior to ratification of the Constitution,
and the police power, to this day, has retained its position.20 Conse-
quently, the police power has remained a demarcation of state sover-
eignty. Because the dormant Commerce Clause is fundamentally a
question of federalism, state sovereignty plays a vital role in deter-
mining the degree of authority the Constitution affords states. Be-
cause a state's sovereignty entails the power to protect the health of
its citizenry, the logical conclusion is that public health issues have a
particularly relevant and valid position in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
Part 11 presents the second purpose of this Note, which is to show
that recent Supreme Court opinions addressing state environmental
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause create a standard
that works to invalidate state programs that are devoted to the protec-
tion of public health. Starting with City of Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey,2 1 the Court has correctly identified the protectionist intent of cer-
tain state environmental regulations, notwithstanding the purported
health and safety concerns of the respective legislatures. In its re-
solve to expose the underlying intent of resource protectionism, how-
ever, the Court has espoused a standard that has been interpreted to
invalidate state environmental laws that pertain significantly to public
health. One example was the invalidation of New York's penalty
system, mentioned above. The district court in that case followed
precedent properly because, under the present "per se invalid" test,
New York's penalty system was undeniably protectionist in nature.
Nevertheless, no alternative systems existed that would have both
convinced a court to follow a more lenient standard and provided
New York an effective means to protect its citizens from the ailments
caused by acid deposition. Therefore, given the particular position of
public health regulation within our federalist structure, courts should
identify the type of environmental regulation at issue. Should the
regulation fundamentally pertain to public health, then a court should
20 Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (emphasizing that a "gen-
eralized police power" reserved to the states "is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history").
21 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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afford the health regulation greater legitimacy within its dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. Otherwise, states lose meaningful par-
ticipation in areas of life directly affecting their citizens.
Finally, Part lII discusses the issue of acid deposition and demon-
strates that it provides an example of an issue that fundamentally per-
tains to public health. While acid deposition impacts natural re-
sources, its constituents have specific impacts on human health as
well, unlike those environmental hazards previously before the Su-
preme Court. The district court opinion in Clean Air Markets Group
v. Pataki,2 2 however, demonstrates that the Supreme Court's "per se
invalid" standard does not adequately highlight the critical state inter-
est in public health. Consequently, while the district court in that case
correctly followed precedent, it invalidated a state law that should
have been upheld. This is for two reasons. First, the regulation of the
pollutants that make up acid deposition rests on a clear public-health
rationale. Second, acid deposition in the Northeast is peculiar in that
nondiscriminatory alternatives do not effectively exist, primarily be-
cause acid deposition is a classic example of an environmental exter-
nality.
Environmental externalities present a singular problem within the
Constitutional context. An environmental externality can be charac-
terized as a problem of costs and benefits: "a state that sends pollution
to another state obtains the labor and fiscal benefits of the economic
activity that generates the pollution but does not suffer the full costs
of the activity.' 23 This imbalance in costs and benefits is exacerbated
by limitations on a state's ability to reach beyond its borders to regu-
late out-of-state actors. Simultaneously, the federal Clean Air Act 24
has failed to prevent states from externalizing their pollution. Conse-
quently, because "the prevailing winds blow from west to east," the
impacts of interstate air pollution in the eastern portion of the United
States are "most serious. 25  Without a reexamination of dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence that appreciates the difference be-
tween resource protection and protection of health and safety, the
disparity of environmental externalities will be permitted to continue.
22 194 F. Supp. 2d 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
23 Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2341, 2343 (1996).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671 (2000).
25 Revesz, supra note 23, at 2351.
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I. THE PURPOSES UNDERLYING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
A. The Consistent Rationale for Natural Resources Protection:
Economics
Among the goals of environmental protection is the protection of
natural resources, which has long been recognized as resting on eco-
nomic principles. 26 Conservation of natural resources arguably be-
came a prominent concern in the nation's collective conscience
through the seminal essays of Frederick Jackson Turner.27 Turner
recognized that the 1890s was the first decade in which America no
longer had a frontier. 28 While Turner's focus was on the effects that
the absence of a frontier had on democracy,29 others began to recog-
nize the potential impact on the economy. 30 The response was the
advocacy for resource regulation. Such regulation was thought to
"smooth out fluctuations in the business cycle or to introduce long-
range calculations [of resource use], which individual entrepreneurs
found hard to do when their competitors were intent on immediate
use." 31 Gifford Pinchot, who spearheaded the effort to create a na-
tional conservation program under Theodore Roosevelt's presidency,
grounded his advocacy in the efficient use of natural resources, "not
for preservation of natural beauty per se." 32 In his published argu-
ment, The Fight for Conservation,3 Pinchot relied exclusively on the
economic aspect of conservation:
When the natural resources of any nation become exhausted,
disaster and decay in every department of national life follow
as a matter of course. Therefore the conservation of natural
resources is the basis, and the only permanent basis, of na-
26 But see, Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2003). Klein presents a very compelling evaluation of the Supreme Court's treatment
of environmental regulations under both the affirmative Commerce Clause and the dormant
Commerce Clause. However, she relies on a basic assumption that resources are delineated
between those that are a "market commodity" and those that are a "natural resource." Id. at 12-
18. This recognition, however, overlooks the economic essence of natural resources. In fact,
the term "resources" itself is defined as the "total means available for economic and political
development, such as mineral wealth and labor." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1162 (3d ed. 1993).
27 See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 145-47 (3d ed. 1967).
28 Id. at 147.
29 Id.
30 Koppes, supra note 18, at 233.
31 Id.
32 ld.at 234.
33 PINCHOT, supra note 18.
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tional success. There are other conditions, but this one lies at
the foundation.34
Although others support the conservation of natural resources in
terms of esthetics, 35 environmental scholars consistently perceive
conservation in economic terms.36  The importance of natural re-
sources to a jurisdiction's economy is critical. Indeed, competition
over access to natural resources may lead to the dangers of hostilities
that Hamilton recognized in Federalist No. 6. As one scholar noted:
The trouble spots of the world, in which warfare goes on or in
which the threat of war exists, are most commonly the re-
source-deficient areas, or those areas lacking the technology
to make use of available resources .... As world populations
continue to grow and as natural resources dwindle, the danger
of war also grows.38
Given this perspective, it is logical to relate the access to natural re-
sources to competition between the "haves" and the "have-nots."
Both commercial competition and competition for natural resources
share the same underlying dangers-potential hostilities. In this
sense, the underlying purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause-to
prevent potential hostilities-equally applies to both economic pro-
tectionism and protection of natural resources.
B. Public Health, the Police Power, and State Sovereignty
If natural resources are inextricably related to economics, then the
dormant Commerce Clause pertains to a state's efforts to protect its
resources. When a state's efforts to protect its natural resources re-
sults in an interference with interstate commerce, the underlying ra-
tionale and goals of the dormant Commerce Clause would direct a
court to consider the state's action within the context of the national
economy. On the other hand, the implication of the dormant Com-
34 Id. at 4.
35 See Koppes, supra note 18, at 233. For an interesting example of the debate between
preservation and conservation, see the discussion of the Hetch Hetchy issue in NASH, supra note
27, at 161-81.
36 See, e.g., DRIESEN, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing the relationship between a growing
economy and the earth's carrying capacity); FRANK E. SMITH, THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION
x (1966) (recognizing that the "[e]mphasis in conservation problems shifts with the changing
economy and the changing environment").
37 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
38 RAYMOND F. DASMANN, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION 1-2 (2d ed. 1968). Cf
ROBERT LEO SMITH & THOMAS M. SMITH, ELEMENTS OF ECOLOGY 166 (4th ed. 1998) (discuss-
ing various forms of intra-species competition when resources are limited).
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merce Clause is that a state may regulate areas "unrelated to eco-
nomic protectionism."39 This undoubtedly includes those areas tradi-
tionally under a state's police power.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the protection of public
health is a fundamental component of the police power. "It is ele-
mental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards
of conduct ... relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital
part of a state's police power. ' 4° The protection of public health also
is an integral part of environmental regulation. As the Supreme Court
stated in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,4'
"[legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people
breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional
concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.' '42 The
Indiana Supreme Court has gone further and recognized the protec-
tion of public health as a fundamental justification for a state's au-
thority to govern.43 That "the preservation of the public health is one
of the duties devolving upon the state, as a sovereign power, cannot
be successfully controverted." 44 One justification for the state's au-
thority to regulate for the public health rests on a state's moral duty to
protect the health, safety and welfare of its citizenry.45
A state's protection of the public health pertains to more than sim-
ple economic concerns. Those non-economic concerns are related to
a particularly important and relevant topic under dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence-state sovereignty. It has previously been ar-
gued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not govern the regula-
tion of prescription drugs because prescription drugs relate to the pub-
lic health, which is "a traditional area of state responsibility."'46 Most
importantly, the Supreme Court has upheld state regulations designed
to prevent the "spread [of] disease, pestilence, and death" under the
dormant Commerce Clause.4 7 In this sense, health and safety are
more central to the exercise of the police power than economic wel-
fare, although all three pertain to the police power. Therefore, the
39 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,454 (1992).
40 Barksy v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954).
41 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
42 Id. at 442.
43 Blue v. Beach, 56 N.E. 89 (Ind. 1900).
44 Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
45 Cf FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971) (discussing how poverty programs are not just a means
of social control but a moral duty of government).
46 Abigail B. Pancoast, Comment, A Test Case for Re-Evaluation of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause: The Maine Rx Program, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 184,201 (2001).
47 Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888).
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former are entitled to greater weight in balancing state sovereignty
with federal economic concerns.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. Background
1. Fundamental Principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause
"The Congress shall have Power To regulate
Commerce ... among the several States. ' '4 The Commerce Clause
has long been held to provide Congress the authority to regulate inter-
state commerce.4 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted the Commerce Clause to provide a degree of limitation on
a state's ability to regulate interstate commerce. 50 For the purpose of
this Note, it is important to understand both the Commerce Clause
and its dormant counterpart as a balance between the prevention of
economic protectionism, on the one hand, and the promotion of a
state's sovereignty manifested through the exercise of its police
power, on the other.
The principle underlying the Commerce Clause and, hence, the
dormant Commerce Clause, was the prevention of balkanization
among the states. One of the primary sources of balkanization, the
Framers thought, was commercial competition among the states. 5'
Indeed, Federalist No. 6, which addressed "Dangers From War Be-
tween the States, ' 2 noted that past wars between nations "have in a
great measure grown out of commercial considerations. 53 Moreover,
because the Framers thought that those "[commercial] situations have
borne the nearest resemblance to our own," the ingredients for com-
mercial hostility among the states were continually present.54 As the
topic and content of Federalist No. 6 suggest, unchecked commercial
competition among the states could lead to hostilities and, perhaps,
war. As a solution, Hamilton urged the creation of a stronger union.
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
49 See generally Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 1 (1824).
50 See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1852).
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
52 THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at xv (Alexander Hamilton) (J.M. Dent & Sons 1970).
53 THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.M. Dent & Sons 1970).
4 Id.
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"The genius of republics .... is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a
tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those in-
flammable humours which have so often kindled into wars. 55 Ac-
cording to the Framers, a centralized government was critical in fos-
tering commercial unity.56
While the theme of balkanization pervaded the Framers' argu-
ments for a centralized government, the Framers also recognized
some flexibility in a state's authority to regulate commerce. In dis-
cussing the "competitions of commerce," Hamilton emphasized that
"[w]e should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were
in reality the justifiable act of independent sovereignties consulting a
distinct interest.,57 While Hamilton suggested that the Constitution
should work to prevent a sovereign from certain actions taken in the
interest of its citizens, his statement also suggested a level of degree
in preventing such actions. In other words, denominating injuries
should be a question of degree and not a categorical rule. Accord-
ingly, the Constitution should recognize certain interests that would
justify a state's regulating commerce when a state is acting consis-
tently with its powers as a sovereign.
2. Common Theme in Modem Dormant Commerce Clause Jurispru-
dence: Balancing the Federalist Interest in a National Economy
against Legitimate State Interests
The extent of a state's sovereignty within our federalist structure is
a function of how the Court interprets the extent of a state's police
power.58 As mentioned, one constitutional source controlling the
extent of a state's authority is found in the dormant Commerce
Clause. In analyzing an alleged violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Court has developed two tests: the "per se invalid" test 59
and the Pike6° balancing test.
55 Id. at 22.
56 Id.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.M. Dent & Sons 1970).
58 See e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982) (discussing extent of state's
proprietary interest in regulation of water use with dormant Commerce Clause context).
59 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
60 Pike v. Brce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). The Supreme Court articulated the
balancing test as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
(citation omitted). If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local inter-
est involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
[Vol. 55:1
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Which test a court will employ depends upon the nature of a
state's interference with interstate commerce. The Pike balancing test
applies to even-handed regulations, while a court will employ the
"per se invalid" test when a state "overtly blocks the flow of interstate
commerce at [its] borders. 62 The "per se invalid" test places the
burden on the state to demonstrate that its interest is sufficiently le-
gitimate to justify incidental burden on interstate commerce.6 3 In
establishing this test, the Supreme Court recognized the underlying
goal of maintaining a national economy:
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an
alertness to the evils of "economic isolation" and protection-
ism, while at the same time recognizing that incidental bur-
dens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a
State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its peo-
ple. Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected
by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has
been erected.64
When a court employs the "per se invalid" test, it will invalidate a
state regulation of interstate commerce unless the state can point to a
legitimate local interest promoted by the regulation and the absence
of other, non-discriminatory means. Because the Supreme Court de-
veloped the "per se invalid" test from the language of the Pike bal-
ancing test,65 the Court purported to take the putative local interest
into consideration. Indeed, the majority in Philadelphia purported to
include a consideration of the legitimate local interest as part of its
"crucial inquiry. 66
Although the Court has developed two tests to analyze dormant
Commerce Clause issues, the underlying state interest in the regula-
tion lies at the heart of both rules. The focus then becomes a question
of whether that interest is constitutionally sufficient to justify interfer-
ence with interstate commerce. With respect to the legitimate local
interest, the Court has created a balancing test in which the legitimate
lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142.
61 The focus of this Note is the "per se invalid" test; however, discussion of one test may
well shed light on the other. This is particularly true because the subject of this Note pertains to
a component that each test shares: the state's putative local interests in regulating commerce.
62 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
63 Id.
fA Id. at 623-24.
65 Id. at 624.
66 Id.
20041
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state interest is weighed against the degree of interference that the
state law or program effects.67 Under this perspective, the "per se
invalid" test and the Pike balancing test both consider the state's le-
gitimate interest. The only difference between the two is the level of
judicial scrutiny. The "per se invalid" test and the Pike balancing test
become "'strict' protectionist effect balancing" and "'weak' protec-
tionist effect balancing," respectively. 68 Nevertheless, the local bene-
fits or interests are invariably part of a court's equation.69
Given the balancing nature of the two dormant Commerce Clause
approaches, it is understandable why a state would cite environmental
protection as the underlying purpose of its regulation: It behooves a
litigant to create a laundry list of reasons supporting its stance. The
more reasons cited, the more apparent weight of the justification.
Environmental protection provides a tactical benefit because envi-
ronmental issues often entail a plethora of concerns.7 ° Under the bal-
ancing tests, the sheer number of interests that support the state's po-
sition may tip the scale in its favor.
The balancing nature of the dormant Commerce Clause tests, how-
ever, requires a court to consider the relevancy and sufficiency of the
underlying interests. For example, a court scrutinizes the nature of
the underlying state interests involved. Those interests that entail a
form of narrow protectionism should not be included on the scale that
balances the state and federal interests. Just because one or more of
the underlying interests entail protectionism, however, does not mean
that a court should discount those that are unrelated to economic pro-
tection. Instead, the concerns pertaining to the Constitution's federal-
ist structure, which underlie the dormant Commerce Clause, demand
that non-economic goals of the state's exercise of its police power
must remain within the equation and not brushed aside as the Court
has recently done.7'
B. The "Per Se Invalid" Test and Environmental Protection
1. Recognition of Natural Resource Protection as a Form of
Protectionism
It is important to understand how the Supreme Court has treated
environmental regulations within the context of the dormant Com-
67 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1105-08 (1986).
68 Id. at 1106.
69 Id. at 1105.
70 See supra text accompanying note 1.
71 See infra Part Il.B.
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merce Clause. The Court's treatment reflects the underlying notion
that resource protection pertains to economics and, hence, economic
protectionism. The most recent opinions that have addressed state
environmental regulations, however, pertained to both resource pro-
tection and public health and safety. These opinions have consis-
tently relied on finding that the underlying purpose of the respective
regulations sought to protect a state's natural resources, even though
there were justifications on the grounds of public health and safety.
In contrast, the dissents in these opinions have consistently argued
that public health and safety concerns constitutionally validate the
laws, while discounting the protectionist components of the regula-
tions. The Court has rightly taken into consideration the protectionist
nature of the regulations, but has ignored other important and compel-
ling state interests. The dissenting opinions, on the other hand, have
rightly addressed the underlying concerns of public health and safety,
but incorrectly suggest that the protectionist nature of the regulations
is irrelevant.
The Court has consistently recognized that resource protection is
not a sufficiently legitimate state concern that would justify overt
interference with interstate commerce. 72 Central to the Court's con-
clusion has been the awareness that resource protection would likely
amount to the same balkanization about which the Framers were con-
cerned. In West v. Kansas Natural Gas C0.,73 the Court stated the oft-
quoted proposition:
In other words, the purpose of [natural gas's] conservation is
in a sense commercial,-the business welfare of the state, as
coal might be, or timber. Both of those products may be lim-
ited in amount, and the same consideration of the public wel-
fare which would confine gas to the use of the inhabitants of
a state would confine them to the inhabitants of the state. If
the states have such power, a singular situation might result.
Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber,
the mining states their minerals .... If one state has [such
72 See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (recognizing that protec-
tion of ground water is a legitimate and important state interest, but concluding that reciprocity
provision effectively prohibiting interstate transportation of ground water was violative of the
dormant Commerce Clause); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 286-87 (1977)
(striking down Virginia law that prohibited nonresidents from fishing in Chesapeake Bay);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 599-600 (1923) (concluding that state statute
prohibiting interstate transportation of natural gas was unconstitutional); West v. Kan. Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911) (enjoining enforcement of state statute prohibiting interstate
transportation of natural gas).
73 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
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power], all states have it; embargo may be retaliated by em-
bargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines. 74
The Court concluded that the welfare of each state depends upon ac-
cess to natural resources of other states. "[T]his was the purpose, as it
is the result, of the interstate commerce clause., 75 The Court, nearly a
century ago, recognized that a state's hoarding of its resources would
not be tolerated because it went against the goal of a national econ-
omy.
2. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey: Development of the "Per Se
Invalid" Test
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey76 provided the framework for
the current debate in the Supreme Court regarding environmental
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. In that case, New
Jersey enacted a statute that overtly banned the importation of most
out-of-state solid waste,77 reasoning that the rapid decrease in landfill
space in the state would lead to environmental threats-through the
improper disposal of waste-and that public health, safety, and wel-
fare required a prohibition against importing waste generated outside
the state. 78 The legislature authorized the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection to establish a moratorium on the importa-
tion of most out-of-state waste until that agency could determine that
importation could be "permitted without endangering the public
health, safety and welfare" of New Jersey citizens.79
Soon after the legislation's enactment, operators of New Jersey
landfills and surrounding out-of-state municipalities sued New Jersey
and its Department of Environmental Protection, alleging that the
statute only burdened interstate commerce. The New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld the statute on the ground that the importation of out-of-
state waste took "a heavy environmental toll, both from pollution and
from loss of scarce open lands" and that the moratorium would extend
the lifespan of existing disposal facilities, preventing virgin wetlands
and other undeveloped lands from being used as landfills.80 More-
over, the court ruled that solid waste in and of itself could be regu-
lated because it was not an article of trade or commerce, but was an
74 Id. at 255.
75 Id.
76 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
77 Id. at 618-19 (noting that the New Jersey statute still allowed the importation of some
waste that could be used for other purposes, such as feeding swine).
78 Id. at 625.
79 Id. at 618-19 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West 1978)).
80 Id. at 625.
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item that could potentially expose the public to risk of disease. 8' The
state validated the law because it, in part, "was designed to protect,
not the State's economy, but its environment. 82
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioners ar-
gued that New Jersey had "outwardly cloaked" financial concerns
"'in the currently fashionable garb of environmental protection.'
83
They asserted that the moratorium was no more than an effort to sta-
bilize disposal costs in the state of New Jersey by sustaining landfill
space and delaying the day that New Jersey citizens would have to
transport their solid waste out of state.
84
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart agreed with the petitioners,
noting that a law that "overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce
at a State's borders" effects "simple economic protectionism., 85 Ac-
knowledging that New Jersey had enacted a law that patently dis-
criminated against interstate trade, Justice Stewart applied a per se
invalidity test.86 The basic inquiry left for the Court was whether the
statute advanced legitimate local concerns or instead amounted to a
protectionist measure.87
The Court concluded that the statute was a protectionist measure
aimed at protecting New Jersey's dwindling landfill space. Justice
Stewart ruled that the statute "impose[d] on out-of-state commercial
interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill
space., 88 Permitting this state action would undermine the goal of a
national economy because the moratorium could result in retaliatory
measures by neighboring states. "Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey
may find it expedient or necessary to send their waste into Pennsyl-
vania or New York for disposal, and those States might then claim the
right to close their borders." 89 In essence, the Court recognized that
solid waste disposal was a national problem. Consequently, New
Jersey was effectively isolating itself "from a problem common to
many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate
trade." 90
With respect to New Jersey's concern about public health and
safety, the Court recognized that the state had "every right" to protect
81 Id. at 622.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted).
84 Id. at 626.
85 Id. at 624.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 628.
89 Id. at 629.
90 Id. at 628.
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"its residents' . . . environment." 9' The Court, however, circumvented
a determination of the constitutional sufficiency of the state interest
by ruling that "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends., 92 The "ultimate legislative pur-
pose," therefore, "would not be relevant to the constitutional issue., 93
The remainder of the majority's opinion focused on the national
scope of the solid waste problem and gave little attention to the state's
interest in protecting the health of its citizens. 94
Then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Philadelphia completed the
framework of the current debate. He focused almost exclusively on
the "currently unsolvable dilemma" created by the "health and safety
hazards associated with landfills. 95 While void of compelling detail,
his argument rested on the health and safety problems that arose from
the volume of solid waste disposed of in New Jersey.96 Justice
Rehnquist stated that the Court had presented New Jersey with a
Hobson's choice:
New Jersey must either prohibit all landfill operations, leav-
ing itself to cast about for a presently nonexistent solution to
the serious problem of disposing of the waste generated
within its own borders, or it must accept waste from every
portion of the United States, thereby multiplying the health
and safety problems which would result if it dealt with such
wastes generated within the State.97
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion was simple: health and safety con-
cerns of this magnitude provided ample justification for a state to
close its borders to out-of-state waste. The dissent never addressed
the protectionist nature of the statute.98
In Philadelphia, the majority considered environmental protection
to be a legitimate state interest, but nevertheless struck down the law
because it found a component of protectionism underlying the statute.
It circumvented the health and safety concerns, stating that the ulti-
mate legislative ends are irrelevant because protectionist effects can
lie in the means as well as the ends. This inconsistency - in ruling
that ultimate legislative ends are irrelevant, but resting its decision on
9' Id. at 626.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 626-29.
95 Id. at 630 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis altered).
98 Id. at 629-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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an underlying protectionist intent-may arise from the Court's reluc-
tance to address public health and safety, which are legislative ends
traditionally and directly related to a fundamental component of a
state's sovereignty. 99 Justice Rehnquist's dissent, however, focused
on the public health and safety problems, concluding that they alone
required upholding the statute. In essence, Rehnquist's dissent indi-
cates that the Court's opinions are neglecting a critical portion of
dormant Commerce Clause analysis: the fundamental notion that the
dormant Commerce Clause should not be interpreted so as to exces-
sively invade the province of state sovereignty.
3. Subsequent Cases
The basic framework outlined in Philadelphia continued in subse-
quent cases. For example, despite a recognition that a "State's inter-
est in preserving its waters [is] well within its police power'"' ° and
that "water is indeed essential for human survival,"'' 1 Nebraska's
reciprocity requirement that other states share water resources in or-
der to receive water from Nebraska operated "as an explicit barrier to
commerce between.. . States."' 2 The conservation and preservation
rationale was irrelevant to the outcome because of the "means-end
relationship" espoused in Philadelphia.10 3 Rehnquist, joined by Jus-
tice O'Connor, again dissented, noting that previous decisions by the
Court had afforded states greater flexibility in regulating a natural
resource that is "essential not only to the well-being but often to the
very lives of its citizens."'' 4 Under Rehnquist's analysis, the essential
quality of the resource gave a state a proprietary interest in that re-
source, and the Court should, consequently, afford states greater lee-
way in determining its use.105
In Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, °6 the Court struck
down an Alabama statute that charged out-of-state imports of hazard-
ous waste $72 per ton, while in-state shipments were charged only a
base fee of $25.60 per ton.10 7 Alabama argued, and the Alabama Su-
99 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (stating
that "[l]egislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls
within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the
police power").
100 Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 946 (1982).
01 Id. at 953.
10 2 Id. at 957.
103 Id. at 958.
l0 Id. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10 5 See id. at 961-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1- 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
10 7 See id. at 338-39.
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preme Court agreed, that the discrepancy in the charges was based on
a need to protect the health and safety of Alabama's citizens and con-
serve the state's natural resources. °8 Upon review by the United
States Supreme Court, Alabama focused almost exclusively on the
legitimate purpose "related to its citizens' health and safety."' 9 The
Court removed the relevancy of public health and safety, however,
quoting Philadelphia at the beginning of its analysis and laying as its
foundation the notion that protectionism can arise from discrimina-
tory means as well as ends. °10 Under this rubric, the Court found that
the additional charge was, in effect, Alabama's attempt to decrease
the volume of waste entering certain hazardous waste facilities in Ala-
bama.11 This was effectively a means to conserve (i.e., protect) the
disposal facilities' capacity to treat hazardous waste. Therefore,
while the Court again said that the ultimate purpose of the statute
does not matter in light of discriminatory means, its argument rested
on the finding of a protectionist intent: to protect the facilities' treat-
ment capacity at a cost to out-of-state actors.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter, concluding that
"the Court continues to err by its failure to recognize that waste-in
this case admittedly hazardous waste-presents risks to the public
health and environment that a State may legitimately wish to
avoid[.]J" 12 This time, however, Rehnquist went further than his pre-
vious opinions by treating the "preservation of the State's natural
resources" as categorically sufficient to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.' 13 Chief Justice Rehnquist
explicitly recognized environmental protection, through resource pro-
tection, as justified when the underlying interest was the health and
safety of a state's citizenry.
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environ-
mental Quality 4 seemed to be a response to Rehnquist's categorical
authorization for states to protect their resources. The Supreme Court
addressed an Oregon statute that charged the import of out-of-state
waste at a higher rate than solid waste generated in the state.' 15 Ore-
gon reasoned that the additional charge treated out-of-state waste
108 Id. at 343.
109 Id. at 342.
1'Old. at 340.
11 See id. at 346 ("[Tlhe additional fee [was] 'an obvious effort to saddle those outside the
State' with most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste into the [hazardous waste disposal]
facility.") (citation omitted).
1 2 Id. at 350 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
1a Id. at 349 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
14511 U.S. 93 (1994).
115 Id. at 96.
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equally with in-state waste, since out-of-state generators were not
required to pay state disposal taxes.'1 6 The state asserted that the ad-
ditional charge of $1.40 per ton reflected this difference. 17 In strik-
ing down the law, the Court rejected Oregon's argument that "if Ore-
gon is engaged in any form of protectiohism, it is 'resource protec-
tionism,' not economic protectionism. 1" 8 The Court reiterated its
previous rule that "'a State may not accord its own inhabitants a pre-
ferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural re-
sources located within its borders.""19 As in Philadelphia, the "natu-
ral resource" at bar was landfill space and, regardless of the health
and safety concerns espoused by the state, "'[n]o State may attempt to
isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising
barriers to the free flow of interstate trade."",120 The Court effectively
concluded that "resource protectionism"' 2 1 will never be valid under
the dormant Commerce Clause.
Chief Justice Rehnquist once again dissented, noting that "the
Court stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that a clean and healthy
environment, unthreatened by the improper disposal of solid waste, is
the commodity really at issue in cases such as these[.],', 22 Rehnquist
claimed that the shortage of landfill space in the country was reaching
a crisis level and that "'a State may favor its own citizens in times of
shortage.' ' 123 As in previous cases, Rehnquist saw the shortage of
landfill space as leading to the improper disposal of solid waste and,
consequently, creating health and safety hazards. According to
Rehnquist, because the Court has recognized a "distinction between
economic protectionism and health and safety regulation promulgated
by [a state],' 2 4 the Court should afford states the requisite flexibility
to protect its citizens.1
2 5
4. The No-Alternatives Exception: Maine v. Taylor
Even if a state enacts what amounts to a protectionist measure, the
Supreme Court will uphold that law when the state has no nondis-
criminatory means of protecting its natural resources. Indeed, Maine
161d. at 105-06.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 107.
119 Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
120 Id. (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1992)).
121 Id. at 107.
122 Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
13Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (quoting Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941,
957 (1982)).
24 Id. (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
15Id. at 108-11 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
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v. Taylor,126 which presented this situation, is the only recent dormant
Commerce Clause case in which the Court has upheld a state envi-
ronmental statute that explicitly banned interstate commerce. The
case involved criminal charges against Taylor for the importation of
158,000 golden shiners, a type of baitfish. 127 Five years earlier, the
Maine legislature had enacted a statute that prohibited the importation
of certain baitfish, including golden shiners.' 28  The purpose of the
amendments was to protect "Maine's unique and fragile fisheries,"
since golden shiners from out-of-state carry parasites that both did not
exist in Maine and would threaten Maine's salmon population. 129
On appeal, Maine argued that in addition to the singularity of its
fish population, there were no reasonable alternatives to inspecting
shipments of baitfish at its borders. Because of the commingling of
different species within large shipments of baitfish, it made inspec-
tions physically impossible.' 30 Additionally, while statistical analyses
were available for inspecting larger fish (e.g., salmon and trout), none
was available for inspecting smaller baitfish. In essence, Maine ar-
gued that it had no alternative but to ban the importation of certain
baitfish until it could employ adequate inspection tests.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, agreed with Maine. He
noted that "the 'abstract possibility,' of developing acceptable testing
procedures, particularly when there is no assurance as to their effec-
tiveness, does not make those procedures an '[a]vailabl[e] ... nondis-
criminatory alternative[s] ....,,,31 Moreover, he noted that the de-
velopment of such procedures "could be expected to take a significant
amount of time." 132  Given the delicate nature of Maine fisheries,
banning the importation of out-of-state baitfish was the only reason-
able alternative to protect them. He concluded that Maine's baitfish
ban "serve[d] legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be
served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives."' 3 3
The decision in Taylor came down to the absence of nondiscrimi-
natory means to protect its resources. While the Court ruled that
Maine's purported interest in protecting its fisheries showed no signs
126477 U.S. 131 (1986).
12 7 1d. at 132. Interestingly, while the federal government initially brought the charges
against Taylor in United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393 (D. Me. 1984), it joined Taylor in
arguing the unconstitutionality of the state statute at the Supreme Court.
128 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 132 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 7613 (West 1981)).
129 Id. at 141. Two prosecution witnesses argued, respectively, that Maine possessed par-
ticularly clean water, supporting a delicate population of fish, and that only Maine has a repre-
sentative population of landlocked salmon. Id. at 141, n.8.
1301d. at 141.
131 Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 151.
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of "protectionist intent," ample evidence suggested otherwise. For
example, the Court downplayed a state agency statement that ques-
tioned "why we should spend our money in Arkansas when it is far
better spent at home" and reasoned that an in-state baitfish industry
"could develop a lucrative export market in neighboring states."'134
Moreover, "golden shiners [were] already present and thriving in
Maine (and, perhaps not coincidentally, the subject of a flourishing
domestic industry)."' 135
5. Summary of the Basic Framework
As the "per se invalid" test has evolved, the Supreme Court has
created a rule that purports to balance state interests with the goal of
preventing balkanization. However, with the additional component-
that protectionism lies in both the ends and the means of state ac-
tion-the Court stops short of the purported structure of its test. By
recognizing that protectionism lies in the means of state action, the
Court has effectively removed any consideration of the state's goals;
the "ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because its
resolution would not be relevant to the constitutional issue." 136 In
essence, the Court is saying that the presence of any protectionism
negates any interest that the state may present on its side of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause scale. Rehnquist, on the other hand, has con-
sistently argued that public health and safety is an important enough
interest to justify any of the state regulations, whether they outwardly
ban interstate commerce or treat out-of-state actors differently. In this
sense, Rehnquist and the Court are moving parallel to one another,
but in opposite directions.
Additionally, the Court in Maine v. Taylor recognized an excep-
tion to the "per se invalid" test when the state has no nondiscrimina-
tory means to protect its interest. This exception appears to be strong
enough to withstand evidence of a protectionist measure.
II. RETAINING THE FRAMERS' INTENT ON NOT INVADING THE
PROVINCE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY: THE EXAMPLE OF ACID RAIN
The issue of acid rain provides an example of when the Court's
"protectionist means" standard raises questions regarding the extent
to which the Court is recognizing interests related to a state's police
power. Acid rain is caused, in part, by the release of sulfur dioxide
134 Id. at 149 (citation omitted).
13 5 Id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
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and nitrogen oxides into the atmosphere.' 37 While aloft, sulfur diox-
ide and nitrogen oxides form sulfuric and nitric acid, 138 and, as rain
falls through the atmosphere, the rain absorbs these acidic aerosols. 139
The greater the concentration of acidic compounds in rain, the lower
its pH. 140  While neutral rainwater has a pH of approximately 5.0,
rainwater in industrial areas of North America are typically around
4.0.141 The impacts of acid rain, thus, are predictable and numerous.
Acid rain can lead to deterioration of man-made structures, fish kills,
decline in forest growth, and negative impacts to soil and human
health. 1
42
The term "acid rain," however, is misleading. Acid rain is only
one component of acid deposition. 143 Acid deposition pertains to both
the deposit of "dry" and "wet" constituents from the atmosphere.' 4
This is particularly important with respect to the health effects of sul-
fur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. "Wet" deposition does not
directly affect humans. 145 However, because both sulfuric and nitric
acid are water soluble in their "dry," aerosol form (the reason they
can readily combine with rain droplets), they are easily absorbed into
the nose and respiratory tract of humans when inhaled.146 Exposure
to these acidic aerosols over a long period of time "is known to dam-
age lung tissue and contribute to the development of respiratory dis-
eases such as asthma and chronic bronchitis."' 147 The constituents of
acid rain also are connected to premature deaths in the United States.
A recent study estimated that, in 2007, approximately 6,000 people
will die prematurely from sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide pollu-
tion.' 48 In addition, those pollutants will cause approximately "4,300
annual cases of chronic bronchitis, 160,000 cases of upper respiratory
symptoms and 140,000 asthma attacks."' 149 Because the study pro-
137 FIRESTONE & REED, supra note 1, at 81. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are emitted
from natural sources as well. However, the primary sources of these pollutants in the United
States are man-made. Cf PETER V. HOBBS, INTRODUCrION TO ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY 134
(2000) (labeling air over northeast United States as "heavily polluted").
138 FIRESTONE & REED, supra note 1, at 81.
139 HOWELLS, supra note 5, at 5-6.
140Id. at 6.
141 Id. at 6.
142 FIRESTONE & REED, supra note 1, at 81.
4 3 HOWELLS, supra note 5, at 5.
144Id. at 5.
145 Id. at 8.
1461 DON'T CARE ABOUT THE AIR!, Health Effects of Pollution, at
http://www.idon'tcareabouttheair.com/facts/health.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
147 Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Acid Rain in Wisconsin, at
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/aw/air/HEALTH/acidrain.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2004).
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jected that the air would be cleaner in 2007, when additional air pollu-
tion reductions are set to take effect, these numbers are lower than
current estimates.50
The study also estimated that, in the state of New York, 340 peo-
ple would die prematurely from sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
pollution in 2007.151 Importantly, most of this pollution comes from
outside of New York.152  The influx of pollution into the Northeast
from out-of-state sources is known as an environmental externality,
which, as previously noted, can be characterized as a problem of costs
and benefits: "a state that sends pollution to another state obtains the
labor and fiscal benefits of the economic activity that generates the
pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the activity.' 153 More-
over, two mechanisms within the federal Clean Air Act are thought to
promote the presence of air pollution externalities.1 54 First, the Act
does not adequately limit the height of smoke stacks. The stack
height determines the distance from the stack that pollution is felt.
The higher the stack, the greater the distance a pollutant travels before
it impacts human populations. 155 Second, a state can locate a pollut-
ing facility close to its downwind border. In this situation, air cur-
rents virtually ensure that air pollution will not reach the regulating
state's population. As a result, the federal Clean Air Act has failed to
prevent a means for states to externalize their pollution. 156 Because
"the prevailing winds blow from west to east," the impacts of inter-
state air pollution in the eastern portion of the United States are "most
serious.' ' 157 Surprisingly, despite the severity of the problem in New
York,158 in-state polluting facilities were responsible for only 13-38%
of the acid deposition within the state.'
59
Pursuant to its authority under the federal Clean Air Act, 6° New
York sought to combat the problem of acid deposition by enacting a
provision that would penalize New York firms that sold their air
1- Seelye, supra note 3.
15 1 Id.
152 Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
153 Revesz, supra note 23, at 2343. I present this same description in the Introduction, in-fra.
a154 Id. at 2350-54.
155 Id. at 2351.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Signs Two Measures Aimed at Cutting Back Pollution,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2000, at B1.
159 Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
160 The Clean Air Act operates by delegating the authority to regulate air pollution sources
to the states through the creation of respective State Implementation Plans. 42 U.S.C. § 7410
(2000).
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emissions credits to power plants in the Midwest and South.1 6  New
York would assess a penalty against New York firms that: 1) trans-
ferred sulfur dioxide credits directly to firms in upwind states; or 2)
transferred sulfur dioxide credits to a non-upwind state without in-
cluding a "restrictive covenant" that prohibited the credits' eventual
transfer and use in an upwind state. 162 Although credits originating
from New York only amounted to approximately 3% of the credits
available to facilities in upwind states,1 63 environmental groups ap-
plauded Governor Pataki when he signed the measure into law.
164
The effect of the New York statute was twofold. First, it required
that a New York firm transferring credits to an upwind state forfeit its
proceeds from that sale to New York's Public Service Commission.1 65
Second, the penalty system impacted the price of New York emis-
sions credits in the interstate market. After New York implemented
its plan, credits originating from New York were 2.5 - 5% less valu-
able than credits in other states. 1
66
The Clean Air Markets Group ("CAMG"), among others, chal-
lenged the validity of New York's penalty system under the Com-
merce Clause and the Supremacy Clause.167  With respect to the
Commerce Clause, CAMG argued that the emissions credits consti-
tuted a commodity and that New York's penalty system amounted to
a "protectionist statute" because it created a barrier to the interstate
trade of emissions credits.1 68 In response, New York asserted that the
system could not constitute a protectionist statute because the penalty
was directed at in-state firms, and that the change in the price of New
York credits was merely incidental. 69 Alternatively, it argued that
161 Hernandez, supra note 158. Air emissions credits dictate how much pollution a facility
may emit. They are meant to create an incentive to reduce pollution through a market-based
system by allowing firms to sell excess credits in the marketplace. Theoretically, if a firm
estimates that a portion of its credits would sell at a higher price than the cost of implementing
pollution control measures, then it will implement those measures and sell the credits to a facil-
ity or firm willing to pay for them. FRANK P. GARD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2-340
(2003).
162 Clean Air Mkts. Group, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 154. According to the stipulated facts in
that case, "upwind states" included New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 152.
1631d. at 162.
164 Hernandez, supra note 158.
165 Id. The forfeited proceeds would help fund the development and use of nonpolluting
sources of energy. Id.
166 Clean Air Mkts. Group, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
1671d.at 150.
168 Id. at 159.
1691Id.
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the statute was not protectionist because the legislature enacted it to
protect natural resources.
170
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that New
York's penalty scheme violated the dormant Commerce Clause be-
cause it amounted to a protectionist measure. 17' It defined a protec-
tionist statute as one that results when "a state isolat[es] itself from a
common problem by restricting the movement of articles of com-
merce in interstate commerce.' 72 New York could not address the
common problem of acid deposition by interfering with interstate
commerce. The court found that the penalty effectively banned the
transfer of credits to upwind states. 173 It also disregarded New York's
assertion that the statute furthered the state interest of environmental
protection. "Even if laudable," the legitimate local interest in protect-
ing the environment was irrelevant to the analysis.
174
The statute in Clean Air Markets Group should have been upheld
for two reasons. First, acid deposition is a problem largely because of
the health effects related to it.1 75  Acid deposition can exacerbate
asthma and bronchitis, cause acute bronchitis, and lead to premature
death. 76 New York alone should expect 340 premature deaths from
acid deposition in 2007, a reduction from current estimates.
77
Clearly, there are specific health effects related to acid deposition that
qualify it as a public health issue. Second, no nondiscriminatory al-
ternative could have provided an effective means to abate the impact
of acid deposition. Acid deposition is a problem virtually exclusive
to the Northeast 78 and is caused by an environmental externality. 179
Given the regionalism that acid deposition invokes, New York-
partnered with other Northeast states-could not compel members of
Congress from upwind states to cut back their utility production.
80
Alternatively, an even-handed regulation would not have effectively
reduced the amount of sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxide entering New
York from out of state. Emissions of those two pollutants originating
1701d. at 161.
171 Id. at 160-61.
172Id. at 161.
17 3 Id. The court noted that with a 100% penalty on transfers that did or may reach upwind
states, "[i]t [was] not speculative to conclude that no New York unit would make such a trans-
fer." Id. at 160.
1
74 Id.
175 See FIRESTONE & REED, supra note 1, at 81.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 146-49.
177 Pianin & Morgan, supra note 3.
178 HOWELLS, supra note 5, at 114.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 154-59.
180 See Bernard C. Melewski, Acid Rain and the Adirondacks: A Legislative History, 66
ALB. L. REV. 171, 204 (2002) (concluding that Congress's recognition of acid rain as a state
issue presents a bulwark in enacting federal protections of the Adirondacks).
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
from upwind states amounted to 62 - 87% of the sulfur dioxide in
New York.81 Additionally, New York's emissions credits amounted
to only 3% of the total credits available to upwind states. 82 Thus, if
New York had ended its emissions credits program altogether, so that
no credits were available, the price increase for upwind facilities
would have been nominal. Indeed, with the penalty system in force,
the cost of credits rose only 2.5 - 5 percent.
83
Clean Air Markets Group exemplifies the ambiguities presented
by the "per se invalid" test when a court addresses an environmental
regulation that entails a clear public health impact. While the district
court correctly employed the test, the nature of the environmental
issue at bar was significantly different from those in the solid and
hazardous waste cases in which the Supreme Court developed its test.
The solid and hazardous waste issues pertained to carrying capacities
of the respective states, as the Court correctly noted. 184 Moreover,
Rehnquist failed to point to a specific health effect from the improper
disposal of solid and hazardous waste.185  In Clean Air Markets
Group, the district court correctly ruled that New York was interfer-
ing with interstate commerce when it found that the penalty scheme
effectively banned the transfer of emissions credits. Nevertheless, the
court's disregard for New York's interest in abating the impact of
acid deposition was in direct reliance on Philadelphia's "protectionist
means" standard. 86 To be sure, New York did not help itself by rely-
ing on a natural-resources protection argument, especially in light of
Justice Thomas's complete rejection of that argument in Oregon
Waste Systems. 187 But the district court's obedience to the "per se
invalid" test compelled it to overlook a key public-health concern.
Upon a closer analysis of the dual purpose of environmental regula-
tion and the underlying federalism argument of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, it is clear that the district court should have afforded
New York greater authority in protecting its citizens.
181 Clean Air Mkts. Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
182 1d. at 162.
183 Id. at 154.
184See supra Part H.
185 Id.
186 Clean Air Mkts. Group, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 160 ("A statute can be protectionist by vir-
tue of not only the legislative ends, but also the legislative means. Thus, regardless of the ulti-
mate legislative purpose, even if laudable, a statute that discriminates against commerce is
protectionist and violates the Constitution." (citation omitted)).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 114-25.
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CONCLUSION
The dormant Commerce Clause is fundamentally an issue of fed-
eralism. As with other issues of federalism, the dormant Commerce
Clause must weigh national interests against state interests to deter-
mine the most efficient and effective use of government. Specifi-
cally, a state's interest in the extent of its police power, and thereby
the extent of its sovereignty, must be judged against the interests in
and benefits of a national economy. Both interests have vied for su-
premacy since before the Constitution. Among the Framers' goals
was the creation of a centralized government that would retain state
sovereignty while preventing the dangers of balkanization. Textually,
this is manifested in the Commerce Clause. Courts have extended the
meaning of that provision to include a dormant, or negative, effect on
state power. That is, the dormant Commerce Clause entails the same
considerations of state sovereignty and balkanization as the Com-
merce Clause does. The dormant Commerce Clause provides a check
against state sovereignty in light of the dangers of balkanization that
might occur should states be allowed to regulate interstate commerce.
Nevertheless, even the Framers recognized a limit on this check.
Where the interests were intimately connected to the state's police
power, courts would afford some leeway in their regulatory affairs.
If modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence consists of a
balancing test, then neither the Supreme Court's analysis nor that of
Chief Justice Rehnquist is entirely correct. The Court's recognition
of protectionism lying in the means as well as the ends of state legis-
lation precludes an appropriate analysis of the putative local concerns
regarding health and safety. Nevertheless, the Court has been correct
in finding that resource protection would likely lead to competition
and balkanization among the states. On the other hand, Rehnquist's
categorical authorization for states to protect their resources when the
public safety and health are involved ignores the balkanizing effect of
resource protectionism. Both analyses contain important and useful
aspects for analyzing state environmental regulations, but neither
analysis is remotely complete. Instead, the opinions in their aggre-
gate-that is, a combination of both the majority and minority opin-
ions of each case-provide the best way to approach an environ-
mental protection problem.
The Court should continue to recognize that resource protection is
not sufficiently legitimate to justify discriminatory behavior. The
majority has correctly deduced that resource protection creates the
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same "evil of protectionism"' 188 as other more directly economic
forms of protection. The underlying rationale of resource conserva-
tion is to protect an area's economy. 89 Since Gifford Pinchot first
began to lobby for the efficient use of resources, 90 economic well-
being has explicitly been conservation's underlying rationale. 91 Ac-
cess to natural resources may lead to conflict between the haves and
have-nots.192 Simultaneously, the Court has recognized that when a
state limits access to natural resources to in-state persons, balkaniza-
tion may likely result because "the purpose of... conservation is in a
sense commercial - the business welfare of the [s]tate."' 93 The Court
in recent years has continued to recognize this attribute of resource
protection when addressing issues labeled as "environmental."'
' 94
Nevertheless, the majority in recent opinions has effectively re-
moved other interests related to environmental protection from con-
sideration under the purported balancing scheme. By fashioning a
perspective that is cognizant of protectionist means, as well as ends,
the Court has precluded any appropriate analysis of the public health
and safety concerns inherently involved with environmental issues. It
has circumvented an analysis of these remaining interests by simply
ruling that protectionist means make legitimate ends irrelevant.1
95
Consideration of those underlying interests, however, is appropriate
under the fundamental rationale of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The dormant Commerce Clause fundamentally involves the goal of a
national economy within the context of state sovereignty, since the
power to regulate commerce to promote interests directly related to
the police power is, at essence, an issue of the state's sovereignty with
the federalist structure. 96  The Court unequivocally has acknowl-
edged that the authority of a state to protect its citizenry's health and
safety is intimately attached to that state's police power. 197 Undoubt-
edly, a state's interest directly related to its police power is a "valid
factor unrelated to economic protectionism.'1 98 Indeed, the validity
of interests intimately attached to a state's police power is sufficiently
important and fundamental in the constitutional context so as not to
188 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
189 See Koppes, supra note 18, at 233; see also PINCHOT, supra note 18, at 4.
190 PINCHOT, supra note 18, at 4.
191 See Koppes, supra note 18, at 233.
192 DASMANN, supra. note 38, at 1-2.
193 West v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
194 See supra Part Ill.
195 Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340 (1992); City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
196 Regan, supra note 67.
197 E.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).
198 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
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be so easily disregarded. Nevertheless, under the majority's current
"per se invalid" analysis, this "valid factor" effectively has no place
in the equation.
Under the current "per se invalid" test, the Supreme Court's "pro-
tectionist means" component allows a court to conclude that a state
action violates the dormant Commerce Clause solely on the ground
that a protectionist scheme exists. When "environmental protection"
is cited, however, the "protectionist means" component creates a test
that is effectively incomplete. Because environmental protection of-
ten involves issues of both resource protection and public health and
safety, the "protectionist means" component leads a court to neglect
some of the state's interests related to the scrutinized regulation. This
might be harmless if the state interests were related to other, strictly
economic concerns. The issue of public health and safety, however,
is not strictly related to economics. A state's interest in protecting the
health and safety of its citizenry is at the core of its police power;
further, the police power is a fundamental aspect of a state's sover-
eignty. Because the dormant Commerce Clause is, fundamentally, an
issue of federalism, a state's sovereignty cannot be so easily cast
aside. By retaining interests related to public health and safety in
dormant Commerce Clause analyses, the jurisprudence would better
reflect core issues underlying this constitutional provision. Other-
wise, states lose meaningful participation in areas of life directly af-
fecting their citizens.
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